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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of final orders entered by the trial judge which held that a 
sales contract for real property located in Smith County Texas could not be enforced, 
challenged or interpreted in the state of Idaho - irregardless of the profound personal and 
financial injury resulting to Plaintiff, an Idaho resident, and other Idaho residents who 
vested monies into the commercial transaction at hand. 
Plaintiff maintains that the trial court's ruling with regards to Plaintiff's access to 
Idaho courts to seek judicial relief from the Defendant's contract breaches, violated l.C. 
29-110 which makes void any contract conditions which restrict an Idaho resident from 
enforcing his rights under the contract in Idaho tribunals. 
The Trial Court also failed to conduct any competent analysis under the tortious 
injury clause of the Idaho long arm statute as it applied to Plaintiffs Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act claim - which subsumes personal torts such as conversion, intentional 
infliction of emotional and mental distress, fraud and deception. The trial court summarily 
concluded that this cause of action was not a tort claim requiring a tortious injury analysis. 
In addition, absolutely no jurisdictional analysis was directed towards plaintiff's 
RICO cause of action because Plaintiff stated this cause of action under Utah law instead 
of Idaho law and because there is no personal jurisdictional guideline under Idaho law 
for RICO acts committed by out of state residents within the 4 corners of the state as 
there is under federal law. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff attempted to amend her underlying complaint when the 
defendants colluded with Idaho executive officials to criminally prosecute plaintiff's for 
felony fraud crimes in order to taint the underlying litigation and win by default. The trial 
court rejected this amendment which would have added additional "personal jurisdictional" 
credence to Plaintiff's already existing RICO claims. 
last but not least, Plaintiff served the Defendant under Idaho's Consumer 
Protection Act's long arm service statute. l.C. Section 48-613. The only defendants that 
appeared in the underlying action, albiet late, were the Smith County defendants, their 
employees and a Texas lawfirm that was instrumental in converting plaintiff's properties by 
authoring a void redemption deed. The remaining defendants were admittedly served 
under this long arm statute by certified mail, but chose not to appear in the action. 
Plaintiff filed the required applications for default certificates and default judgments as 
required under Idaho law, and served these documents upon each of the defaulting 
defendants. More than one month later, on July 15, 2011, Judge Dunn issued an order 
finding that because the Consumer Protection Act's long arm service statute did not 
include the words Summons and complaint in it's description of process to be served, 
the statute was not effective for service of a lawsuit upon the defendants. Accordingly, 
the court found that Plaintiff had not effected proper service on the non-appearing 
defendants, and hence refused to enter defaults and default judgments against the 
remaining "noticed", but non-appearing defendants. 
II. Course of Proceedings 
The underlying complaint asserts that the Smith County Defendants with 
the aid of their attorney lawfirm the former defaulting owners, breached a land sales 
contract for undeveloped property located in Smith County Texas; thereby causing 
substantial financial and tortious injury to plaintiff in the state of Idaho. Plaintiff also 
argued an Idaho RICO claim against the defendants for theft by unauthorized transfer, 
theft by false promise, theft by extortion, and extortion by a public servant. Aff. Telford, 
para.3, C.R. 138. 
Plaintiff caused all defendants to be served the Summons and Complaint under 
Idaho's long arm service statute, l.C. Section 48-613, based on the inclusion of NOTICE 
in the text of the statute. The Idaho Supreme Court publishes default papers under it's 
website which mandates the entry of default judgment against a non-appearing 
Defendant after receiving NOTICE of an action taken against that Defendant. The point 
here being, the words Summons and Complaint are not included in the body of the 
FORM default papers published by the Idaho Supreme court. Plaintiff contends that she 
made proper service on all defendants be serving them by certified mail as permitted by 
this statute. The specially appearing defendants all admitted that they had been served 
by certified mail. 
When the time expired for responding to Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff 
demanded default certificates and default judgments be entered against all non-appearing 
defendants. See C.R. 43 -121 ans C.Supp. R. 12-59. 
On July 15, 2011, Judge Dunn instructed the clerk not to enter the defaults and 
default judgments against the non-appearing Defendants because the statute did not 
include the word summons in it's body and therefore Plaintiff was required to employ 
personal on the out-of-state defendants. 
The County defendants and their attorneys and lawfirm in the meantime made 
a special appearance in the action moving to dismiss plaintiffs claims for lack of personal 
jurisdiction based on a general contacts analysis with the state. Plaintiff responded 
indicating that the contacts analysis was specific and in support thereof, Plaintiff 
provided very inculpitory evidence against the Defendants which she attached to her 
July 18, 2011 Affidavit. As a matter of coarse, Plaintiff files her documents with the 
court clerk and then faxes these documents to the judge for his records as required under 
IRCP Rule 7. 
Immediately after Plaintiff submitted her July 18, 2011 Affidavit to the 
Defendant's mutual defense firm/counsel colluded with Oneida County executive officials 
to raid Telford's home on August 10, 2011 in order to seize all of plaintiffs original 
electronic and paper evidence against these defendants and thereby obstruct proving the 
underlyng action. 
Telford filed a verified objection with the court on August 18 2011 indicating 
that she was demanding from the criminal court the return of all of her electronic and 
paper records regarding the underlying action. See C.R. 192-260. As exhibit "3" 
attached to Telford's Verified Objection, C.R. 220-247, Telford provided Judge Dunn with 
a copy of her mandamus writ directed to the criminal court and demanding the return of 
all of Telford's electronic and paper evidence seized during the aforesaid illegal search. 
On September 1, 2011, plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Defendant's motion 
to dismiss. Plaintiff argued that theDefendants had made a general appearance by 
arguing beyond personal jurisdiction issues. For example, the Defendants asked the 
Judge to dismiss Plaintiffs action entirely with prejudice as barred by the Statute of 
Frauds because Plaintiffs interest in the Texas property was not committed in writing by 
delivery of a written Deed. Plaintiff cited to the affidavits of more than 5 affiants including 
herself which showed numerous oral promises made by the Defendants ; all of which 
induced part performance by plaintiff; performances which caused substantial injury to 
plaintiff and the other affiants supporting Plaintiff's Opposition to the motion to dismiss, 
sufficient to avoid application of the statute of frauds and to invoke a constructive trust. 
C.R. 273-277. The Defendants also argued that plaintiff could not sustain an Idaho 
RICO prosecution against the Defendants because Plaintiff was not a state prosecutor 
and therefore could not prosecute crimes. Plaintiff cited to US Supreme Court law in re 
Rotella v. Wood, 528 US 549 (2000) for the legal conclusion by the US Supreme Court 
that State and Federal RICO statutes allow a private plaintiff to act as a private attorney 
general and prosecute named crimes protected by the relevant RICO statutes. C.R. 278-
279. Finally, the Defendants argued that Plaintiff could not state any variation of a fraud 
crime against the Defendants or statutory liability claim under the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act. 
On October 3, 2011, District Judge Dunn entered a decision on the 
Defendants motion to Dismiss, converting same to a summary judgment motion based 
on Telford's considerable evidence submitted outside the four corners of the Complaint. 
Judge Dunn restricted his decision to the issue of personal jurisdiction rejecting 
any need to reach the substance of Plaintiff's causes of action. Judge Dunn's 
Decision was based largely upon Telford's July 18, 2011 affidavit with attached exhibits 
sent to Judge Dunn's chambers by fax on August 1, 2011. The Decision is found @C.R. 
300 - 315. Judge Dunn took on the mantle of defendant's attorney and assumed or 
fabricated facts not in the record. 
First, Judge Dunn concluded that the sales contract accepted 
by Telford was formed in Texas - which was blatently false given 
there would have been no contract without Telford's money 
consideration to form the contract and which monies and Telford's 
acceptance generated from the state of Idaho. 
Second, Judge Dunn concluded that because the property 
was located in Texas that Telford could not access Idaho courts to 
seek relief for breaches of the sales contract. This conclusion of law 
violated l.C. section 29-110. 
Third, Judge Dunn argued theories of active and passive 
websites; an argument never raised by opposing counsel and 
therefore waived as a matter of law. C.R. 393, sub paragraph 2. 
Fourth, Judge Dunn avoided commenting on the more then 9 
phone calls, 2 faxes and 6 emails made by Defendants and directed 
to Telford in the state of Idaho as shown in C.R. 273, in order to 
avoid the Defendant's "directed acts" against an Idaho resident. 
Furthermore, while Judge Dunn mentioned that Telford 
improved the property, he did not mention that the actual value of 
improvements at the time of the October 3,2011 Decision was at 
least $250,000.00 and that these assets, which were collateralized 
by Idaho and Utah citizens, had been converted by the Defendants 
- thus adding a new cause of action for constructive trust. 
Finally, there was no susbstantive assessment of plaintiff's 
causes of actions presented in her complaint. 
Immediately after Judge Dunn issued his October 3, 2011 Decision, the 
Oneida County Prosecutor charged Telford with forgery of Clerk Diane Skidmore's notary 
onto Telford's affidavit dated July 18, 2011 - in order to defeat the underlying civil litigation 
by a fabricated fraud charge. In fact, what the Prosecutor had done was seize Telford's 
original July 18, 2011 affidavit from Telford's abode during the illegal search on August 
10, 2011, cut off Diane Skidmore's original notary from Telford's original July 18, 2011 
affidavit, drawn down another copy of Holli's draft of her July 18, 2011 Affidavit from 
Holli's computers which were also seized on August 10, 2011, and taped Diane 
Skidmore's original notary to the newly drawn draft copy. The Prosecutor then 
subsequently charged Telford with forging Diane Skidmore's notary to her July 18, 2011 
Affidavit and with multiplicious counts of submitting this false document to various public 
offices in re Sixth Judicial District of Idaho, Oneida County case no. 2011-CR-958, 
What the prosecutor did not take into account was that Telford had a common practice of 
obtaining at least three original notaries on the same document and preserving these 
originals at various locations for safe keeping. Ultimately Telford would produce another 
orignally notarized July 18, 2011 Affidavit to the criminal court, which resulted in dismissal 
of all criminal charges with prejudice on April 5, 2012. 
In the interim however, Telford timely moved for rule 11 reconsideration 
and to take in new evidence of additional Idaho RICO charges of theft by 
extortion in the illicit use of the Idaho criminal system to defeat Telford's civil 
claims against the Defendants herein. C.R. 315-358. 
Telford argued that there was no question that the Defendants 
committed injury within the 4 corners of the state of Idaho sufficient to 
be held to answer for their tortious and criminal activity in the state of 
Idaho by virtue of the pending criminal prosecution. Telford sought to 
supplement her complaint with these additional RICO allegations in 
accordance with !RCP rule 15(b). 
Telford also argued the laws relating to formation of contracts; 
all of which concluded that a contract is formed in the state where: (1) 
the contract is signed (here, the contract being the bid contract 
constituting acceptance of Smith County's unilateral offer to sell the 
property to the winning bidder); (2) where the contract is reduced to 
writing and signed; (3) consideration is provided to support the 
contract; (4) the offeree accepts the terms of a unilateral offer and 
performs on those terms; (5) loan obligations are comitted to 
provide consideration for the contract; and (6) communications are 
directed to firm up the terms of the contract C.R. 318 - 320. In the 
instant case, all of the contract formation took place in the State of 
Idaho. 
In addition, Telford also raised violations of l.C. 29-110 and 
the Court's failure to address the tortious injury prong under the Due 
Process clause of both the Idaho Long arm Statute and the Federal 
Constitution which placed personal jurisdiction in the forum where 
Plaintiff alleged the injuries were felt or had an effect. C.R. 317, para. 
3, footnote 2. Plaintiff cited to gth circuit cases holding that personal 
jurisdiction exists in the forum where plaintiff suffers pecuniary or 
other personal injury from the defendant's tortious acts. C.R. 336-
337. Plaintiff also cited to Blimka v. MyWeb WholesalerLLC, 152 
P.3d 594, 143 Idaho 723 (ID 2008) where the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that personal jurisdiction lied in the state of Idaho where Blimka 
was induced to part with funds as a result of the Defendant's 
fraud. C.R. 337, footnote 8. As exhibit "3" attached to Telford's 
rule 11 motion, Telford attached a voice recording of the selling officer 
Lois Mosley in April of 2011 when Mosley had confirmed that the 
property was not subject to redemption and that the sale was 
conclusive and binding. 
Finally, Telford sought an analysis of personal jurisdiction 
under Idaho's RICO act with the last overt act being being the corrupt 
and abusive initiation of criminal process against Telford in Oneida 
County Idaho. 
On February 29, 2012, Judge Dunn completely avoided Telford's petition to 
augment the underlying case with an abuse of process claim and additional allegations 
under the Idaho RICO act. Rather Judge Dunn's ruling was solely limited to the 
purchase transaction itself and the torts present at the time Telford purchased the 
property, not after when Telford learned about the fraud, conversion and RICO violations. 
Judge Dunn refused to find personal jurisdiction in the state of Idaho because the 
transaction involved the purchase of real property in the State of Texas which could not be 
physically delivered to Telford in Idaho. C.R. 420, para. 1 : 
If the real property [sic but] had been portable and Telford had " 
taken possession of the property in Idaho, like the purchaser in 
Blimka, then the tort prong of the Idaho Long Arm Statute may 
have allowed this Court to exercise jurisdiction over the 
Defendants. However, real property is not portable. Under 
these circumstances the injury could only be felt in Texas. 
Likewise, Judge Dunn concluded that the Due Process clause of the US 
Constitution barred personal jurisdiction over the defendants in Idaho because Telford 
could only possess the property in Texas. 
On March 15, 2012, plaintiff filed a rule 60(b)(3) motion to vacate the February 
29, 2012 ruling on the grounds that the ruling had not been sent to plaintiff in order to give 
plaintiff opportunity to object. On March 21, 2012, Judge Dunn gave plaintiff an 
additional 14 days from the date of March 15, 2012 in which to file an objection to the 
Feruary 29, 2012 Decision. See C.R. 433, paragraph 5. 
On March 27, 2012, Telford filed an affidavit indicating the progress of the 
February 14, 2012 oral proceedings before the court. In paragraphs 7-8@ C.R. 437-438, 
Telford complained that she needed to amend the complaint to state "in state" RICO, 
abuse of process and conversion claims against the Defendants. Telford specifically 
attested : 
" I just learned that the Defendants had stolen mine and Ferron " 
Stokes manufactured home on the property, all of our 
construction equipment, and our heavy duty dump trailer -
based on opposing counsel's proclamation to the remainder 
Defendants that Oneida County was prosecuting me for 14 
felony counts and that I would therefore not be able to 
prosecute my claims herein due to likely incarceration in jail. " 
Telford argued that the Court was required to hear Telford's new allegations 
under the doctrine of Merger. In paragrap 11 @ C.R. 438 - 439, Telford further attested: 
It is undisputed that I argued an Idaho RICO claim back in 
July of 2011 and that the new theft and extortion facts raised 
at the February 14, 2012 hearing raised additional predicate 
RICO acts consummated in the state of Idaho (citing fn. 5) and 
showed continuous racketeering activity. 
Telford cited to footnote 5 @ C.R. 439 for the law acquiring personal jurisdiction over the 
Defendants under the criminal statutes when an element of a a crime is committed within 
the jurisdiction. TELFORD urged that l.C. 19-302 served as a jurisdictional statute for 
her RICO claims (C.R. 441) and that the Court failed to conduct any jurisdictional 
analysis under her RICO causes of action. Telford cited to the affidavits of Ferron Stokes 
and Mike Slicker C.R. 444 - 448 as containing party opponent admissions that the Texas 
defendants had illicitly used the criminal process in the state of Idaho as a vehicle to steal 
plaintiff's properties in the state of Texas as proscribed by Idaho's theft by extortion 
statute. C.R. 440. In particular, the Slicker affidavit presents party opponent 
admissions made by the KELLEY defendants who were served with the process herein 
but never appeared to defend, C.R. 444, para. 5, to wit: 
" I went over to the property with LA Greer and began asking the default " 
owners what they were doing with Ms. Telford's properties. The 
Defaulted Sandra Colemen and the Kelley Family informed us that they 
had beat Ms. Telford in a lawsuit in Idaho, that they now owned Ms. 
Telford's properties, and that Ms. Telford was going to jail for a long 
time. We expressed disbelief and asked where they had removed Ms 
Telford's properties. They refused to tell us. 
On March 28, 2012, Judge Dunn rejected Telford's efforts to supplement 
additional RICO allegations into the case which accrued after the filing of the initial 
complaint in April of 2011 - because the Court had decided to dispose the case : 
" based on the pleadings, factually supplemented by affidavits. " 
C.R. 451, paragraph 2. The Court opined that since Telford's supplemental allegations 
were not presented in the initial complaint, and could not be tried by consent given there 
was no trial in the case, the court had no duty to allow the additional allegations in by 
way of amendment of the initial complaint. In addition, the Court re-affirmed that 
Telford's RICO claims did not create personal jurisdiction in the State of Idaho because 
the gravamen of the RICO charges dealt with non-portable real property (deferring to the 
analysis rendered in the court's February 29, 2012 Decision.). C.R. 451- 452. 
On April 5, 2012, the felony charges advanced by the defendants herein were 
dismissed with prejudice. After dismissal of the felony case, the Oneida County 
prosecutor spoiled or destroyed plaintiffs original evidence against Smith County to 
prevent Plaintiff from presenting her evidence at the time of trial in any case. 
On April 10, 2012, Telford timely appealed the final rulings in the underlying 
action. A clerk's record was created by clerk Diane Skidmore on September, 2012. 
While going through the clerk's certified record, Telford noticed that the exhibits attached 
to Telford's July 18, 2011 Affidavit had not been included in the clerk's record. Telford filed 
a motion to augment the trial record. Judge Dunn scheduled a hearing for October 9, 
2012. At this hearing, Judge Dunn admitted that the missing exhibits to which Telford 
referred were attached to the original affidavit submitted by Telford - but set aside in the 
Court's file. Judge Dunn held that because Telford's original affidavit dated July 18, 2011 
did not have a file stamp affixed to this Affidavit, that the Affidavit with attached 11 
exhibits could not be included in the clerk's record. Judge Dunn then : (1) instructed 
Telford to execute another affidavit which attached thereto the exhibits set aside in the 
court's file, but never officially filed stamped into the record on August 1, 2011; (2) 
directed the clerk to file stamp Telford's affidavit providing the missing exhibits, pursuant 
to rule 1 O; and (3) instructed Telford to move the Idaho Supreme Court to augment the 
record with her rule 10 affidavit. On October 10, 2012, Telford filed her rule 10 affidavit 
attaching the missing exhibits. 
Telford subsequently moved the Idaho Supreme Court to augment the record 
with her rule 10 affidavit. Justice Jim Jones was the assigned schedule B justice 
handling all motions for the court. Justice Jone's long time law clerk Yvonne A. Dunbar 
had recently joined the defense firm representing the County defendants herein, I.e. the 
law offices of ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP. Attorney ADAMS from this lawfirm lied 
to the Supreme Court when he represented that Judge Dunn never considered the 
missing exhibits which in fact formed the basis of Judge Dunn's October 3, 2011 
Decision. To add insult to injury, Attorney Adams then further denied receiving notice of 
the October 10, 2012 Affidavit OR Telford's Motion to Augment the record. In response, 
Telford filed a motion for contempt against opposing counsel and his clients for attempted 
fraud upon the court and provided electronic copies of her emails upon opposing counsel. 
Justice Jones improperly summarily denied Telford's motion to augment the record or to 
find opposing counsel in contempt. By Opposing counsel's misconduct, critical 
evidentiary documents presented to the trial court are now withheld from this record. 
With the foregoing case history, Telford now presents her Statement Of Facts. 
Statement Of Facts 
The underlying action involves interstate internet sales of distressed properties 
and landlots by Smith County Texas while acting in a private and commercial capacity. 1 
In the instant case, Smith County as the owner of certain undeveloped real 
property, offered to re-sell this land lot over the internet to any person of interest. Plaintiff 
accepted the offer at a sum certain price based on the information provided by Smith 
County over their website. The relevant mandatory procedures that must be utilized by 
Smith County when selling properties owned by them are as follows: 
1. The Texas Legislature has concluded that government units engaging in 
contractual relations wil not be immuned from with liability or suit for breaches in their 
respective contracts. See Texas Local Government Code § 271.151.160 et seq. 
which prohibits the granting of any immunity from suit to a government unit (or official) 
entering into a contract. Followed in Catalina Development, Inc. v. County of El Paso, 
121 S.W.3d 704, 705 (Tex. 2003) ( "By entering into a contract, a governmental entity 
necessarily waives immunity from liability under the sue and be sued clause and 
voluntarily binds itself like any other party to the terms of an agreement." The 
government performs a private function when entering into a contract with another 
person, and therefore no official immunity lies.). See Texas H.B. 2039 codified as Local 
Government Code §§271.151.160 and providing that "by entering a contract, local 
governmental entities waive their sovereign immunity to suit for breach of that contract."). 
See also Paula Construction, Inc. v. City of Lytle, 220 S.W.3d 16 (Tex.App. Dist. 4 
2006) (The City of Lytle "may sue and be sued, implead and be impleaded, and answer 
and be answered in any matter in any court or other place." Tex. Loe. Gov't Code Ann. § 
51.013 (Vernon 1999). Paula Construction argues on appeal that the City of Lytle's 
immunity from suit is waived by the application of the Local Government Code. See 
Tex. Loe. Gov't Code Ann.§ 271.151.160 and 271.152 (Vernon 2005) [Act of June 17, 
2005, 79th Leg. R.S., ch. 604, § 1, 2005 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1549]. Section 271.152 
reads: A local governmental entity that is authorized by statute or the constitution to enter 
into a contract and that enters into a contract waives sovereign immunity to suit for the 
purpose of adjudicating claims relative to that contract. Moreover, the statute's legislative 
history indicates that, by enacting section 271.152, the Legislature intended to loosen the 
immunity bar so "that all local governmental entities that have been given or are given the 
statutory authority to enter into contracts shall not be immune from suits arising from 
those contracts." House Comm. on Civil Practices, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2039, 79th 
Leg., R.S. (2005) (emphasis added). Followed in Ben Bolt-Palito Blanco Consol. lndep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Political Subdivs. Prop./Cas. Joint Self-Ins. Fund, 212 S.W.3d 320, 
327 (Tex. 2006), and The City of Houston v. Steve Williams, et al, No. 09-0770 (Tex. 
03/18/2011). In 1970, the Texas Supreme Court held that such "sue and be sued" 
language granted legislative consent for lawsuits. See Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Brownsville 
Navigation Dist., 453 S.W.2d@813 (Tex. 1970). Local Govt Code§ 271.151.160. 
Texas Property Tax Code. Sec. 34.01. Sale Of Property. 
(e) A notice of sale must substantially comply with this subsection. 
The notice must include: 
( 1) a statement of the authority under which the sale is to be 
made; 
(2) the date, time, and location of the sale; and 
(3) a brief description of the property to be sold. 
(m) The officer making the sale shall prepare a deed to the 
purchaser of real property at the sale, to any other person whom the 
purchaser may specify, or to the taxing unit to which the property was bid off. 
(n) The deed vests good and perfect title in the purchaser or the 
purchaser's assigns to the interest owned by the defendant in the property 
subject to the foreclosure, including the defendant's right to the use and 
possession of the property, subject only to the defendant's right of 
redemption. 
(o) If a bid sufficient to pay the amount specified by Subsection (p) is 
not received, the officer making the sale, with the consent of the collector who 
applied for the tax warrant, may offer property seized ... to a person for less 
than that amount . 
(q) A sale of property under this section to a purchaser other than a 
taxing unit: 
(1) extinguishes each lien securing payment of the delinquent 
taxes, penalties, and interest against that property and included in the 
judgment; and 
Texas Tax Code § 34.21. RIGHT OF REDEMPTION provides: 
(e) The owner of real property sold at a tax sale other than property 
that was used as the residence homestead of the owner when the suit or the 
application for the warrant was filed, may redeem the property in the same 
manner and by paying the same amounts as prescribed by Subsection (a), 
(b), (c), or (d), as applicable, except that: 
(1) the owner's right of redemption may be exercised not later 
than the 180th day following the date on which the purchaser's taxing 
unit's deed is filed for record; and ... redemption fees have been paid to 
the purchaser. 
Pursuant to § 34.01 (e)(3), Smith County listed the property as bearing situs 
address 14811 FM 2661 and sought $11,320.00 as the opening bid. C.R. 32 2 . 
Plaintiff Telford examined the Smith County Appraisal Districts Website to verify 
other specs on the property. Two properties bore the situs address of 14811 FM 2661 
2. C.R. _ stands for Clerk's Record@ page no. of page. 
and both of these addresses were listed as belonging to Joseph and Tammy Conflitti. A 
research of one address bore a land lot with an outshed. The other property bore a 
sizeable home and acreage. Plaintiff contacted Smith County whom informed plaintiff 
that the lot with the outshed was the lot up for re-sale. Aff. Telford, para. 5, C.R. 139. 
After researching the foregoing property information, Plaintiff contacted Smith 
County and was directed to first submit a letter of credit to prove her ability to pay for any 
winning bid. Aff. Telford, para. 7, C.R. 139. Plaintiff did submit this letter of credit to the 
selling officer Lois Mosley, C. Supp. R 135 3 , in conjunction with a written bid just 
above the asking bid price. Lois Mosley also asked Plaintiff to pay a 1/3 cash deposit of 
her bid price and to send these deposit funds in a cashiers check or wire the funds to 
Smith County through Smith County's attorneys Linebarger, Goggan, Blair & Sampson, 
LLP. A deposit amount of $4,214.77 was wire transferred from Plaintiff's bank to Smith 
County's lawfirm in March of 2011. C.R. 258-259. 
On March 31, 2011, Kim Vogt, a relative of Elham Neilsen, appeared at the 
County Assessor's office to hear the winning bidders on the offered properties. Telford 
was the only bidder on the subject property and was declared as the new owner. 
Aff. Neilsen, para.8,C.R.128; Aff. Vogt, para.4, C.R.134-135;Aff. Telford,para.11, CR 140 
3. The 9th Circuit and Idaho both hold unilateral contracts subject to 
enforcement. In Evanston Insurance Company, supra,the 9th circuit held that "A 
unilateral contract exists when one party offers to do a certain thing in exchange for the 
other's performance, and performance by the other party constitutes acceptance and 
execution of the contract." Here, the fax from Bellevue Master to Northwest on 
February 22, 2001 was an offer: Northwest would be able to continue working as a 
subcontractor at the construction project provided it complied with Bellevue Master's 
insurance requirements. When Northwest contacted its insurance broker and 
requested that the broker issue the insurance certificate to Bellevue Master, Northwest 
accepted the unilateral contract, and a contract was thereby formed, executed and 
subject to enforcement." Idaho also concurs that a unilateral contract will be formed 
and executed when the offeree performs upon the terms of an offer in Shore v. 
Peterson, 204 P.3d 1114, 146 Idaho 903 (Idaho 2009) ("where the offeror makes a 
promise that is conditional on the offeree"s acceptance, an offeree accepts by 
rendition of the requested performance."). Also see CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 21 
at 52 (1963) (An offer for a unilateral contract calls for acceptance by rendition of 
the requested performance.) J. CALAMARI and J.PERILLO, THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 1-10 (1977). Deer Creek, Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 
107 Idaho 286, 291, 688 P2d 1191, 1196 (Ct. App. 1984). 
On April 4, 2011, various Smith County Assessor employees including the 
selling officer Lois Mosley, called Telford at her place of residence in Idaho no less then 
three times to inform TELFORD that she had won the bid on the property and seeking to 
exercise the letter of credit. The phone calls were conferenced by TELFORD to third 
persons having an interest in improving the property. These calls were also preserved 
on Telford's magic jack phone and a digital photograph was made of these phone calls. 
Aff. Telford, para. 9, C.R. 141, Exhibit 3, C.R. 149; Neilsen, para. 9, C.R. 128; and Aff. 
Greer, para. 7, C.R. 132. 
During the phone call with the selling officer Lois Mosley, Ms. Mosley inquired 
of Telford on how to exercise Telford's letter of credit for the balance of the purchase price. 
TELFORD instructed Lois that she would need to sign a sealed letter which : (1) 
announced Telford as the winning bidder; (2) indicated that the sale was conclusive and 
binding; (3) informed the bank that Smith County was exercising the letter of credit, and; 
(4) announced that Telford could now possess the property and make improvements 
thereto. Aff. Telford, para(s) 9 and 11, C.R. 141. 
Before executing the foregoing letter, both Lois Mosley and Appellant Holli 
Telford checked the deeding history to this undeveloped lot - in order to calculate the 
redemption period set forth in § 34.01(n) and § 34.21(e)(1) and to make sure that the 
prior defaulted owners could not r edeem the subject real property. 
This research revealed that two dates were listed for filing the Deed for 
record as indicated in § 34.21 (e)(1) supra and both dates by passed the 180 day period: 
First: On August 10, 2010, Smith County foreclosed on the 
subject real property (formerly owned by the Estate of Paul Kelley Sr. 
with Sandra Coleman as administrator) as Smith County Texas civil 
cause no. 22, 107-C. On or about September 10, 2010, Smith 
County was given a deed in their favor which Smith County filed of 
record in Smith County Texas civil cause no. 22, 107-C. 
Second : On November 2, 2010, Smith County attempted to 
sell the property - but no one submitted a bid and the propety was 
struck off back to Smith County. When this sale failed, Smith County 
recorded it's Deed dated October 12, 2010 with the Smith County 
Appraisal District. 
In addition, a third statute came into play. Specifically : 
Texas Tax Code§ 34.23(b) provides: "the owner of property sold 
for taxes to a taxing unit may not redeem the property from the 
taxing unit after the property has been resold." 
Also, Texas Tax Code§ 34.0S(d) enhances Texas Tax Code§ 34.23(b) in that 
it provides the following resale restrictons: 
The acceptance of a bid by an officer conducting the sale is 
conclusive and binding. On conclusion of the sale, the officer 
making the sale shall prepare a deed to the purchaser. The 
County Clerk shall file and record each deed under this 
subsection and after recording shall return the deed to the 
grantee. 
These laws were cited by Telford without contest by the Smith County Defendants while 
the case pended before the trial court. Aff. Telford, para. 10, C.R. 140. 
On April 5, 2011, both Telford and the selling officer Lois Mosley concurred 
that no redemption rights existed for the defaulted owners, and hence, Lois Mosley 
would be executing the requested letter and directing Smith County's attorneys to approve 
Mosley's executed Deed and deliver same to Telford. On April 5, 2010, a legal 
secretary from the law offices of Linebarger, Goggan, Blair & Sampson sent Telford an 
email indicating that they were mailing to Telford's Idaho address, the original deed to 
the Smith County property along with a letter confirming purchase of this property so that 
Telford could present this letter as a bill of sale to an insurance carrier for purposes of 
insurance. This email communication was attached as exhibit "4" to Telford's July 18, 
2011 Affidavit as indicated in paragraph 10 of Telford's Affidavit, C.R. 141. This email 
however has been removed from the court's file and Justice Jim Jones refused to 
supplement this email into the court record subject to Telford's motion to augment 
the Supreme Court record. 
On April 8, 2011, Lois Mosely did execute an official letter representing to 
Telford's bank that : (1) Telford was the winning bidder ; (2) the sale was conclusive 
and binding ; (3) Telford could now possess and occupy the property, (4) Telford could 
make improvements to the property; (5) the defaulted owners passed the 180 
redemption period and therefore could not redeem the property, and (6) since the 
property had been resold to Telford, the prior owners could not redeem the property 
pursuant to Texas Tax Code § 34.23(b). See C.R. 141 @ paragraph 11 which refers to 
this letter being attached as exhibit "5" to the July 18, 2011 Affidavit of Telford. This 
letter however has been removed from the court's file and Justice Jim Jones 
refused to supplement this letter into the court record subject to Telford's motion to 
augment the Supreme Court record. Also see Aff. Neilsen, para. 9, C.R. 128 for 
reference to this letter. 
Shortly after the purchase was finalized and several months after Smith County 
had negotiated Telford's purchase fees on the property, Telford learned that the property 
offered by Smith County as previously owned by the Conflittis - was not the property sold 
to Telford by Smith County ; that Smith County had errored on the auction listing. 
C.R. 141-142. The Smith county property actually sold to Plaintiff in fact bore 
no physical address because it had never been designated as a residence address 
for the prior owner. The true property was in serious disrepair, had foliage and shrub 
trees overgrown on the property and had a brick shack which had been badly burned in a 
fire years before. 
Telford, Neilsen, Greer, and Vogt, subsequently appeared at the assessor's 
office and notified the auction officer Lois Mosley of the true condition of the distressed 
property. Holli presented Lois Mosley with the auction listing which bore the incorrect 
address and the Smith County abstract on the distressed property which bore no address. 
Finally Telford presented Lois Mosley with Texas Property Tax Code section 34.0S(d) 
which mandated an accurate description on the property being sold. Lois Mosley 
instructed Telford to tender a modified bid for the property she purchased - at the value 
of the property only. Smith County Appraisal District reflected the value of the land at 
$4200. Telford did resubmit a modified bid at $4,200. 4 C.R. 24, para.6, and C.R. 34, 
exhibit "3" attached to complaint. The Court's October 3, 2011 Memorandum decision 
reflects that Smith County instructed Telford to submit a modified bid at the value of the 
property - by the following findings of fact found in the October 3, 2011 Decision. C.R.304: 
" Plaintiff discovered there was an error in the address on the 
4. Because Holli had already submitted a deposit of $4,214.77, she had 
overpaid the sum of $14.77 which Holli expected to be advanced towards future property 
taxes if Holli won the bid. C.R. 258 259. 
property list posted on the website. After Plaintiff advised Smith 
County of the error she was directed to the property that Smith 
County actually owned and that she had purchased. The parcel 
Plaintiff purchased was significantly different than anticipated. 
Because of this error, the Smith County Tax Assessor's Office 
allowed Plaintiff to adjust her bid to reflect the value of the 
correct property. Plaintiff changed her bid to reflect the value of 
the true property and began to improve the property to suit her 
intended purposes. 
The actual property resold by Smith County to Telford was formerly owned by 
Paul W. Kelley Sr. who died in 1999. Defendant Sandra Coleman became the 
administrator of his estate. The Property was never claimed or utilized as a residence 
homestead within the required meaning of Texas Tax Code § 11.13. 5 In addition, at the 
time of the judgment selling the property back to Smith County entered on September 10, 
2010 in Smith County case no. 22, 107C, the owner Paul Kelly Sr. had been dead for 11 
years and the property wasn't occupied, but rather was abandoned. The administrator of 
the estate, Defendant Coleman, had not paid the property taxes on this property since 
2007. The actual tax debt at the time of the re-sale to plaintiff was $4100. The 
"residence homestead" status was relevant to the inquiry of when the redemption period 
on the property began and terminated. According to the Texas redemption statute, this 
"abandoned property" had to have been used as a residence homestead at the time 
cause no. 22, 107C had been commenced in August of 2010. Since the property was not 
a residence homestead in August of 2010, the defaulted owners on the property had 180 
days following the taxing unit's recordation of their deed in cause no. 22, 107C on 
September 10, 2010 in which to pay the redemption fees, redemption costs plus the 
redemption premium of 25% to Plaintiff - as the purchaser at the resale auction. 6 
5. Texas Tax Code § 11.13 provides as follows: 
( 1) "Residence homestead" means a structure ... secured and occupied .. 
that: (A) is owned by one or more individuals, (8) is ... adapted for human residence; (C) 
is used as a residence; and (D) is occupied as his principal residence by an owner 
6. Texas Tax Code§ 34.21. RIGHT OF REDEMPTION reads as follows: 
(e) The owner of real property sold at a tax sale other than property that 
was used as the residence homestead of the owner when the suit or the application for 
the warrant was filed, may redeem the property in the same manner and by paying the 
same amounts as prescribed by Subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d), as applicable, except that: 
In addition, Telford purchased the property at a re-sale auction given the 
property was not sold at the first auction conducted on November 2, 2010. Pursuant to 
Texas Tax Code § 34.23(b) : "an owner may not redeem property that has been 
resold by a taxing unit." Therefore, the re-sale to Telford protected Telford against 
the redemption rights of the prior owner as a matter of law. 
In accordance with Texas Property Tax Code § 34.05(e), the selling officer Lois 
Mosley had a duty to turn over the deed on the property to Telford 7 , especially after the 
re-sale which cut off the right to redemption pursuant to § 34.23(b). According to the 
email sent to Telford on April 5, 2011 by Smith County's attorneys [and now gutted from 
the record by clerk Diane Skidmoreas stated supra], the lawfirm had indicated that they 
mailed the Deed to Telford at her Idaho address. Furthermore under the doctrine of 
partial performance, the resale was binding and could not be revoked. 
Telford made substantial improvements to the property once the selling officer 
confirmed to Telford that the sale was conclusive and binding and that Telford could now 
( 1) 
(2) 
the owner's right of redemption may be exercised not later than 
the 180th day following the date on which the purchaser's or 
taxing unit's deed is filed for record; and ... redemption fees have 
been paid to the purchaser. 
Redemption "Costs" include: 
(A) the amount reasonably spent by the purchaser maintaining, 
preserving, and safekeeping the property, including the cost 
of: 
(i) 
(ii) 
property insurance; 
repairs or improvements required ... by a lease of the 
property; 
(B) Redemption premiums of 25% first year, 50% second year .. 
7. Texas Property Tax Code§ 34.05: RESALE BY TAXING UNIT, provides in 
material parts as follows: 
( d) . . . The acceptance of a bid by the officer conducting the sale is 
conclusive and binding on the question of its sufficiency. 
(e) The presiding officer of a taxing unit selling real property 
... shall execute a deed to the property conveying to the 
purchaser the right, title, and interest acquired or held by each 
taxing unit that was a party to the judgment foreclosing tax 
liens on the property. The conveyance shall be made subject to 
any remaining right of redemption at the time of the sale. 
For non-residential property, the redemption right expires 180 days after the Deed is first 
filed of record. The Deed was filed in Cause no. 22, 107C on September 10, 2010. 
improve the property and make it into a residential structure. Telford, Stokes and other 
investment partners improved the property to the tune of $250,000 by excavating the 
property, by developing the infrastructure to situate and affix a double wide manufactured 
home and by moving too and affixing a double-wide manufactured home permanently to 
the property. During the foregoing development process, Telford also consummated a 
residential lease with affiant Kim Vogt to cover the debt created by the improvements. 
After the foregoing substantial improvements had been made, and while 
Telford and others were on the property finishing up the improvements, on June 1, 2011 
Paul Kelly Jr and Paul Kelly Senior's ex wife appeared at the property to inquire into it's 
disposition. Telford informed the Kelleys in front of everyone that Telford had purchased 
the property from Smith County back in March of 2011 and that the property was not 
subject to redemption based on the passing of the 180 day redemption period and re-sale 
of the property to Telford. 
The Kelleys subsequently left the property and appeared at that the Assessor's 
office to inquire into how they could void the sale and be unjustly enriched by the over 
$250,000 improvements made to the property. The Kelleys promised to pay the County 
more than three times the sales price paid by TELFORD if the county would revoke the 
sale. The sales officer Lois Mosley informed the Kelleys that Mosley had not yet 
delivered the deed to Telford and that failure to deliver the deed could possibly void the 
sale. Mosley also indicated that there was a problem with the redemption period because 
the property was not a residential property. 8 The Kelleys informed Mosley that the 
property now had a residence on it due to TELFORD's improvements. Mosley instructed 
the Kelleys to return to the property and take pictures of the residence and the Smith 
County Assessor's office would extend the redemption period to 2 years as residential 
8. Under Texas law to claim a residential property exemption : Texas Tax 
Code§ 34.21(e) requires· the real property sold at a tax sale must have been "used 
as the residence homestead of the owner when the suit or the application for the 
warrant was filed." Here, the suit for forclosure on tax liens against the Kelley estate 
was filed in June of 2010. At that time, there was no residence on the property. 
Therefore the Kelleys could not claim the 2 year redemption period as a matter of law. 
property. The Kellys did return to the property and take pictures of the home while 
plaintiff's lessee occupied the home. C.R. 137, para. 11. The selling officer never turned 
the deed over to Telford as required under Texas Tax Code § 34.05(d); thus effectively 
obtstructing the conveyance. C.R. C.R. 27, para. 19. 
After numerous demands to turn over the Deed, on June 3, 2011, 
TELFORD sued Smith County, the Assessor-Collector and a conspiring lawfirm for : 
(1) specific performance demanding turn over of the Deed; (2) Breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, (3) Violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, and (4) 
for RICO violations based on RICO acts of false promises and theft by conversion of the 
Ded promised to TELFORD. C.R. 29, para. 25. 
All defendant parties were immediately served under Idaho's Consumer 
Protection Acts long arm service statute. l.C. 48-613(2). County Judge Joel Baker 
received service of process for Smith county as their statutory agent. C.R. 103-104. 
Attorney Tab Beall and his lawfirm made a special appearance and moved to 
dismiss Plaintiff's complaint against them based on the claim that the state of Idaho had 
no general jurisdiction over them because they did not have property in Idaho nor did they 
do business in the State of Idaho. C. Supp. R. 87-89. 
Smith County and the Assessor - Collector separately moved to dismiss the 
suit because they were a govermental entity residing in Texas and did not exercise any 
governmental functions in the state of Idaho. C. Supp.R. 117-118. Consequently they 
too claimed lack of general personal jurisdiction over them. 
The Kelley - Coleman defendants did not make any appearances. 
Telford responded to the Smith County Defendant's motion to dismiss by 
asserting that Smith County's status as a governmental entity was not recognized under 
Texas law because the county was engaging in contracting acts with private parties for 
goods and services. Accordingly, Telford argued that Smith County was liable for their 
actions as any other private party would be citing the authority set forth in footnote 1 
supra at page 11. Telford further argued that the State of Idaho had specific personal 
jurisdiction over the County defendants because their illegal acts were knowingly directed 
at an Idaho resident. 
Telford also argued that Beall and his lawfirm were aiding and abetting false 
promise, theft by conversion and theft by extortion and therefore were equally liable as 
the principal for advancing the goals of a civil or criminal conspiracy. Telford asserted 
that the state of Idaho had specific not general jurisdiction over Beall and his lawfirm in 
the State of Idaho. C.R. 264-289. C.R. 315-339. 
More than 6 weeks after all the defendants in the suit had been served with 
process and therefore knew the value of the properties they had stolen by failure to 
deliver the deed to TELFORD, on July 11, 2011, the Kelleys appeared before the 
Smith County Tax Collector Gary Barber to illegally redeem the property. Gary Barber 
had been served and had responded to the Idaho lawsuit as above shown, and therefore 
knew that the Kelleys did not have any redemption rights available to them. 
Nevertheless, Gary Barber invalidly received significantly insufficient redemption fees in 
the amount of $12,608.36 from the Kelleys (under a 2 year redemption theory premised 
upon a residential property) and without the required affidavit indicating that the Kelleys 
could not locate TELFORD to settle the amount of redemption fees due TELFORD as the 
purchaser, as required under Texas law. See Texas Tax Code § 34.21 (f) provides that 
the owner of the real property must make an affidavit that the owner has made diligent 
search in the county in which the property is located for the purchaser at the tax sale and 
has failed to find the purchaser, . . . before the defaulted owner may contact the 
assessor-collector to pay any redemption fees. Here, the Kelleys knew at all times 
where they could contact Plaintiff because they had been served with and received notice 
of the Idaho lawsuit. See C.R. 43-143. Hence if redemption were available, which it 
was not, the Kelleys redemption was still invalid for failure to tender a valid affidavit 
explaining their attempts to redeem the property from plaintiff as the purchaser thereto. 
Moreover, the redemption fees would have cost no less than $250,000; the amount of 
monies Telford and others spent to improve the property on behalf of the leasehold 
contract, plus a 25% redemption fee. 
Nevertheless, after Gary Barber illegally accepted these fees, Defendant 
Barber turned the matter of preparing the Deed over to the lawfirm of Purdue, Brandon, 
Felter & Mott; the same lawfirm named as a defendant and specially appearing in this 
underlying Idaho lawsuit, and whom TELFORD charged with conspiracy to commit theft 
by false promise in failing to deliver the DEED to TELFORD and with theft by 
conversion by nullifying TELFORD's entitlement to the DEED. 
This defendant lawfirm and specifically Attorney Tab Beall, also named and 
served as a defendant herein, constructed and authored a void Redemption Deed which 
purported to convey the subject real property to Paul Kelly Jr., knowing that a 
constructive trust had been effectively placed on the property by virtue of the massive 
improvements made to the property before conveyance of the void redemption Deed 
AND knowing that he was aiding and abetting theft crimes against TELFORD and other 
Idaho investors. Tab Beall then tendered this void Redemption Deed to County Judge 
Joel Baker for execution. County Judge Joel Baker was the statutory agent served with 
Smith Courty's lawsuit (C.R. 103-104) and therefore had personal knowledge that the 
Redemption Deed he executed on July 11, 2011 was illegal, void & against public policy. 
TELFORD presented this void Redemption to the trial court pre-decision 
entered on October 3, 2011. Judge Dunn in his October 3, 2011 decision even referred 
to this redemption deed in his findings of fact, C.R. 304, para. 2 to wit: 
After Plaintiff incurred substantial costs improving the land, 
Plaintiff was notified that the former owner had redeemed 
the Property and that the Smith County Tax Assessors 
Office was revoking the sale. 
The Court record now shows an absence of this Redemption Deed from the 
record which Plaintiff contends was gutted from the court's record. 9 
9. During a rule 10 proceeding conducted by Judge Dunn on October 9, 2012, 
Judge Dunn admitted that the court file contained an original July 18, 2011 Affidavit with 
11 attached exhibits by TELFORD - but because the clerk failed to affix a file stamp to 
this original record, the Court was not going to include TELFORD original affidavit into the 
clerk's record on appeal. The Court disregarded Plaintiff's claim that she fax served 
Judge Dunn with a copy of her original affidavit with all attached exhibits to his chambers 
on August 1, 2011 as required under rule 7, and that Judge Dunn must have considered 
his chambers copy because Judge Dunn made no mention of missing exhibits from 
Plaintiff's July 18, 2011 Affidavit in his October 3, 2011 Decision, which fact findings were 
almost entirely predicated on TELFORD's July 18, 2011 Affidavit. See C.R. 303-304. 
Judge Dunn refused to perform his duties under rule 10 and correct the record. Instead 
he referred TELFORD to the Idaho Supreme Court for a motion to supplement the record. 
Justice Jim Jones long time law clerk just joined the lawfirm representing the courty 
defendants herein and biasly and wrongfully refused to augment these missing records 
into this appeal, and which formed the basis of the trial court's rulings. 
Immediately after TELFORD presented her inculptory evidence against the 
defendants as attached to her July 18, 2011 Affidavit (see C.R. 138-145 which refers to 
11 exhibits in the body of her affidavit but only three exhibits were included in the clerk's 
record ), the Appellee's attorneys herein colluded with the Oneida County Prosecutor to 
conduct an illegal search and seizure on Plaintiff's home for the purpose of seizing and 
destroying all of Plaintiff's electronic and paper evidence against the Defendants 
/Appellees herein. On August 10, 2011, Oneida county executive officials led by the 
prosecutor, searched and seized every electronic device, electronic record and paper 
record located in TELFORD's home - based on a general search warrant which failed to 
identify any crime committed by TELFORD. 
TELFORD immediately complained to Judge Dunn about the seizure of the trial 
records and evidence and asked for a contiuance of the proceedings. C.R. 192-260. 
Opposing counsel objected to the continuance. As part of her application to continue, 
TELFORD provided a copy of her mandamus petition submitted to the criminal court 
demanding return of all her illegally seized civil case files and records, among other 
properties. C.R. 220-247. Judge Dunn did continue the summary judgment proceedings 
for a limited period of time. Judge Dunn subsequently made his decision on October 3, 
2011 based on the filings made pre-seizure of TELFORD's property on August 10, 2011. 
Judge Dunn's October 3, 2011 Decision was limited to the issue of personal 
jurisdiction under a contracts theory. The Decision mis-represented several facts material 
to Judge Dunn's contracts analysis and accordingly caused a misapplication of the law. 
For example, Judge Dunn found that TELFORD traveled to Texas and executed her bid 
contract in Texas. In fact, there were absoluely no facts in the record to support this 
finding or conclusion of law. TELFORD never traveled to Texas for purposes of bidding 
on the property in question. The record showed that unilateral contract was initiated over 
the internet by Smith County reaching into the state of Idaho to advertise property for 
sale in Texas. C.R. 343, para.6. The bid /purchase contract that TELFORD commited 
in writing : (1) was signed and executed in Malad Idaho (C.R. 343, para. 7) ; (2) was 
supported by money and loan considerations generating from Idaho lenders (see C.R. 
343, para. 7; C.R. 446-447) ; (3) obligated TELFORD to commitments in the state of 
Idaho (C.R. 343, para. 7), and ; (4) the negotiations were the product of more than 9 
phone calls, 2 faxes and 6 emails sent into the state of Idaho by the Defendants during 
the negotiations process. C.R. 273. para. 3. 
Based on Judge Dunn's erroneous findings, Judge Dunn concluded the that 
contract at issue was formed in Texas. After correcting Judge Dunn's clearly erroneous 
findings, TELFORD set forth the relevant laws establishing the loci for the "formation of 
contracts" in C.R. Pages 318 - 321, and which all affirmed that Idaho was the loci where 
the bid acceptance contract was formed. 
TELFORD also objected to the lack of any analysis under Idaho's tortious 
injury prong of the Idaho Long Arm Statute and any jurisdictional analysis for contacts with 
the state of Idaho when the elements of any crimes are committed within the state. C.R. 
333-336. 
On February 29, 2012, Judge Dunn issued a Decision opining personal 
jurisdiction under the tortious injury prong of the Idaho Long Arm Statute and the Due 
Process Clause. Judge Dunn refused to find personal jurisdiction in the state of Idaho 
because the transaction involved the purchase of real property in the State of Texas which 
could not be physically delivered to Telford in Idaho. C.R. 420, para. 1 : 
If the real property [sic but] had been portable and Telford had " 
taken possession of the property in Idaho, like the purchaser in 
Blimka, then the tort prong of the Idaho Long Arm Statute may 
have allowed this Court to exercise jurisdiction over the 
Defendants. However, real property is not portable. Under 
these circumstances the injury could only be felt in Texas. 
Likewise, Judge Dunn concluded that the Due Process clause of the US 
Constitution barred personal jurisdiction over the defendants in Idaho because Telford 
could only possess the property in Texas. 
Plaintiff objected to the courts order because Plaintiff was not seeking 
delivery of the non-portable real property to Idaho; rather Plaintiff was seeking delivery of 
the "portable DEED" to her in the state of Idaho. Plaintiff argued that failure to deliver that 
DEED created a constructive trust on the Texas property which the Idaho courts could 
decide pursuant to Andre v. Morrow, 680 P.2d, 1355, 106 Idaho 455 (ID, 1984) C.R. 394 , 
C.R. 395 footnote 4, and l.C. Section 29-110. 10 In addition plaintiff cited to 
various portable properties belonging to Idaho citizens and which were also located on 
the Texas property - to included heavy duty construction equipment and dump trailers. 
Plaintiff urged that these "portable" properties did not align with the Court's due process 
analysis. Finally, plaintiff complained about the lack of any jurisdictional analysis under 
her RICO claims. 
Remarkably, shortly after Plaintiff identified her portable properties, the 
Defendants removed and concealed Plaintiffs portable properties from the Texas 
property to avoid liablity for these claims. 
On March 27, 2012, Telford filed an affidavit complaining about the recent 
theft of her portable properties and needing to amend her complaint to include RICO 
claims relative to using the criminal process in the state of Idaho to extort TELFORD of 
her civil claims in the underlying litigation. C.R. 437-438, para(s) 7-8. Telford specifically 
attested: 
" I just learned that the Defendants had stolen mine and Ferron " 
Stokes manufactured home on the property, all of our 
construction equipment, and our heavy duty dump trailer -
based on opposing counsel's proclamation to the remainder 
Defendants that Oneida County was prosecuting me for 14 
felony counts and that I would therefore not be able to 
prosecute my claims herein due to likely incarceration in jail. " 
Telford argued that the Court was required to hear Telford's RICO allegations 
under the criminal statute providing for jurisdiction in the state of Idaho when an element 
of a crime is committed within this jurisdiction. See l.C. 19-302. C.R. 441. Telford 
complained that the Court failed to conduct any jurisdictional analysis under her RICO 
causes of action. Telford cited to the affidavits of Ferron Stokes and Mike Slicker C.R. 
444 - 448 as containing party opponent admissions that the Texas defendants had illicitly 
used the criminal process in the state of Idaho as a vehicle to steal plaintiffs properties in 
the state of Texas as proscribed by Idaho's theft by extortion statute. C.R. 440. In 
particular, the Slicker affidavit presented party opponent admissions made by the 
KELLEY defendants (who were served with the process herein but never appeared to 
defend). See C.R. 444, para. 5, to wit: 
" I went over to the property with LA Greer and began asking the default " 
owners what they were doing with Ms. Telford's properties. The 
Defaulted Owners Sandra Colemen and the Kelley Family informed us 
that they had beat Ms. Telford in a lawsuit in Idaho, that they now owned 
Ms. Telford's properties, and that Ms. Telford was going to jail for a 
long time. We expressed disbelief and asked where they had removed Ms 
Telford's properties. They refused to tell us. 
Sustaining the doctrine of Merger. In paragraph 11 @ C.R. 438 - 439, Telford further 
attested: 
It is undisputed that I argued an Idaho RICO claim back in 
July of 2011 and that the new theft and extortion facts raised 
at the February 14, 2012 hearing raised additional predicate 
RICO acts consummated in the state of Idaho (citing fn. 5) and 
showed continuous racketeering activity. 
C.R. 439, para. 5. 
" 
On March 28, 2012, out of a measure of precaution, the Court summarily 
addressed TELFORD's jurisdictional claims under the RICO statute by adopting his 
analysis tendered under the tortious injury prong which held that because the real 
proeprty in Texas was not portable to the state of Idaho, Idaho could not obtain personal 
jurisdiction over the defendants. C.R. 451- 452. 
COMES NOW, plaintiff and presents her Statement of Issues presenting both 
first impression and common questions : 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether substituted service of a summons and complaint by certified 
mail upon the out of state parties in the underlying case under the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act's Long Arm service statute, l.C. 48-613, constituted valid service of 
Process on these defendants so served and commanded the entry of a defaults and 
default judgments as to these Defendants who failed to appear and defend. 
2. Whether the commission of an illegal act as proscribed under Idaho's 
Consumer Practices Act section 48-603 by the out of state seller herein against 
TELFORD, a resident of the state of Idaho, automatically granted personal jurisdiction 
over the seller. 
3. Whether TELFORD"S bid contract was formed in the state of Idaho 
sufficient to invoke personal jurisdiction over all parties to that contract : when TELFORD 
signed the bid contract in Malad Idaho, TELFORD committed herself to loans and other 
financial obligations with Idaho lenders to provide consideration for the bid contract; and 
TELFORD collateralized Idaho personal and real properties to provide securities for the 
loans serving as consideration for the contract. 
4. Whether equity claims of specific performance and constructive trust may 
be heard in Idaho courts when pertaining to real estate located outside the state of Idaho 
- when the fraud or deception practiced by the tortfeasor specifically caused to the 
equitable claims to arise to the injury of an Idaho resident, here TELFORD. 
5. Whether l.C. 19-302 may be used as a jurisdictional statute to invoke 
personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants who commit in whole or in part any 
element of a racketeering predicate act within the state of Idaho. 
6. Whether the specially appearing defendants actually made a general 
appearance in the underlying action because they failed to limit their initial motion to an 
attack on personal jurisdiction only. 
7. Whether the trial court errored as a matter of law when he entered a 
final judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims against the specially appearing defendants 
with prejudice on the grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction, in violation of IRCP rule 
41(b). 
8. Whether the trial court errored in not allowing TELFORD to amend her 
complaint in accordance with the evidence presented before the conclusion of the case. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Jurisdiction is a question of law and is reviewed de nova. State v. Barros, 131 
Idaho 379, 381, 957 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1998). 
A question of law is reviewed de nano. State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 
84, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009) 
Jurisdiction for Appeal 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuan to l.C. 13-201 and 1.A.R. 
11 (7) as final judgments have been rendered in the case. 
Issue No. 1 
Whether substituted service of a summons and complaint by certified mail 
upon the out of state parties in the underlying case under the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act's Long Arm service statute. l.C. 48-613, constituted valid service of 
Process on these defendants so served and commanded the entry of a defaults and 
default judgments as to these Defendants who failed to appear and defend. 
Plaintiff's complaint sought as one of it's primary claims, a statutory cause of 
action under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, This act provides a specific long arm 
service statute under l.C. 48-613 as set out below : 
l.C. 48-613. Service of notice. Service of any notice, demand or subpoena 
under this act shall be made personally within this state, but if such 
cannot be obtained, substituted service therefor may be made in the 
following manner: 
(1) Personal service thereof without this state; or 
(2) The mailing thereof by registered or certified mail to the last known 
place of business, residence or abode within or without this state 
of such person for whom the same is intended; or 
(3) As to any person other than a natural person, in the manner 
provided in the Idaho rules of civil procedure as if a complaint 
which institutes a civil proceeding had been filed. 
For every Defendant that plaintiff sued under this cause of action, Plaintiff 
exercised the substituted service provision under this statute because the Defendant 
could not be served with Notice of the lawsuit personally within this state - as each 
Defendant resided at an abode without the state. Accordingly, as admitted in each 
default certificate and return of Summons, each Defendant was served by certified mail 
to the last known place of residence or abode without this state. The original certified 
receipts were timely filed with the court and attached to their respective returns of 
Summons. C.R. 43-121. 
When the served Defendant did not appear, Plaintiff filed a Request for Clerk's 
entry of Default and Default judgment pursuant to IRCP rules 55(a) and (b)(1) and an 
Affidavit in support thereof, as to each non-appearing Defendant. C.R. 43-121. 
On July 18, 2011, Judge Dunn entered a Decision denying the entry of 
defaults and default judgments as to each non-appearing Defendant. C.R. 122-124. The 
basis for denying the defaults/judgments was because Plaintiff had served each 
(, 
Defendant by certified mail pursuant to l.C. 48-613 (2) supra, and not personally as required 
under IRCP rule 55(b)(1). The court also noted that the long arm service statute did not provide 
for service of a summons. 
TELFORD objected arguing that the long arm service statute provided for the 
service of NOTICE or SUBPEONA, both of which are alternative forms of a Summons. 
Telford also claimed that the form MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT 
printed on the Idaho Supreme Court's website provided the following language to enter 
the default of a civil defendant : 
Plaintiff moves this Court for Entry of Default on the grounds that Defendant, 
having (a) received notice (emphasis added) by personal service; or (b) 
been served by publication, has failed to appear within the time period for 
answering the Complaint in the above-entitled matter. This motion is made 
pursuant to Rule 55( a)( 1) Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the pleadings 
filed herein. 
The word Summons in nowhere in the form default document. Moreover, 
TELFORD cited the rule that the more specific statute controls over the more general 
statute, here rule 4. See Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 313, 208 P.3d 
289, 295 (2009) . Also TELFORD indicated that Judge Brown, a co ordinate court to 
Judge Dunn, found service by certified mail acceptable in CPA cases. 
Nevertheless, there exists a conflict in the CPA long arm service statute and 
IRCP Rule 55(b)(1) because the latter statute provides that a default may only be taken 
against a defendant that defendant is personally served or served by publication. 
Plaintiff asks that this Court resolve the conflict in these two rules in Plaintiff's favor and 
entere the defaults and default judgments of each non-appearing Defendant. 
Issue No.2 
Whether the commission of an illegal act as proscribed under Idaho's Consumer 
Practices Act section 48-603 by the out of state seller against TELFORD, a resident 
of the state of Idaho, automatically granted personal jurisdiction over the seller. 
Plaintiff could only find one case on point with foregoing service made under 
the state's ralted CPA statute, to wit: 
State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n 81 Wn.2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 
(1972) Here, Reader's Digest, was sending unsolicited sweepstakes 
solicitations through the mail to Washington residents at a time when 
sweepstakes were prohibited by Washington law. 
Reader's Digest challenged the superior court's personal 
jurisdiction. On appeal, our Supreme Court reversed the superior 
court's dismissal, holding that "performance of an unfair trade 
practice in this state by a foreign corporation which has no 
agents, employees, offices or other property in the state, is a 
sufficient contact to establish jurisdiction" under the CPA's long-
arm statute. Id. at 276. The court also held that recognizing personal 
jurisdiction under the CPA "does not offend traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice, because the offender "solicit[s] Washington 
business .... by methods proscribed under the act. Id. at 278. 
Under such circumstances, it "is the duty of the state to protect 
its residents from such unfair practices. If our courts are not open, 
the state will be without a remedy and the Consumer Protection 
Act will be rendered useless. 
In the instant case, plaintiff alleged the following unfair trade practices 
committed by the Defendants.' 
l.C. 48-603. Unfair methods and practices. 
The following unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby 
declared to be unlawful, where a person knows, or in the exercise of 
due care should know, that he has in the past, or is: 
(4) Using deceptive representations or designations of 
geographic origin in connection with goods or services; 
(5) Representing that goods or services have sponsorship, 
approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that 
they do not have 
(9) Advertising goods or services with intent not to sell 
them as advertised; 
(17) Engaging in any act or practice which is otherwise 
misleading, false, or deceptive to the consumer. 
Furthermore in White v. Mock, 104 P.3d 356, 140 Idaho 882 (Idaho 2004), this 
court held that real estates transactions were covered under the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act. 
In the case at bar, the record shows that the defendant's used deceptive 
designations of geographic origin in connection with the original sale of property to 
TELFORD - leading TELFORD to believe she had purchased the Conflittis property 
which had qualities which were completely lacking in the real property sold to TELFORD. 
While this deception may have been cured by allowing TELFORD to modify her bid to 
reflect the actual value of the land sold to TELFORD, the defendants subsequent actions 
evidenced further violations of the Act in that these defendants advertised conveyance 
services to plaintiff repeatedly and adnausium with intent not to sell these services as 
advertised. Moreover, the defendants continued to lull TELFORD into believing they 
would perform the required conveyance, in order to procure TELFORD to substantively 
improve the property so that the county could later collect additional claimed redemption 
fees three times greater than the previous purchase fees pad by TELFORD in the 
amount of $4,217.00, and which said fees were never returned to TELFORD. Finally, 
there is no question that the Defendants actions as a whole both before, during and at the 
conclusion of the CPA litigation, were misleading, false and deceptive to TELFORD , an 
Idaho consumer. 
Idaho following the teachings of the Montana and Oregon Supreme Courts 
has held that where a specific statute provides a resident with contractual remedies 
before the Idaho Courts, restricting those contractual remedies violates public policy. 
See Cerami-Kate v. Energywave Corporation, 773 P.2d 1143; 116 Idaho 56 (ID, 1989), a 
Consumer Protection Act case wherein Plaintiffs sued for violations under the Act and 
Energywave filed a motion to dismiss based upon contractual language which selected 
the law of Florida as the law to be applied to the contract and which designated a 
particular county court in Florida as the venue for the enforcement, construction, or 
interpretation of the contract. The Supreme Court struck down any contract provision 
that purported to restrict an Idaho citizen from enforcing any right under a contract 
subject to the CPA, in Idaho tribunals, as void against public policy set forth in the CPA 
and l.C. 29-110. Following State ex rel Polaris Industries v. District Court, 695 P.2d 471 
(Mont.1985), and Rose v. Etling, 255 Or. 395, 467 P.2d 633 (1970), also CPA cases 
wherein the courts ruled that a specific statute providing for protection of the usual 
remedies granted to the buyer by statute could not be restricted by a venue selection 
clause which voided venue in the ldahocourts.) 
TELFORD asserts that since the Idaho Consumer Protection Act is a specific 
statute providing remedies to consumers of the state of Idaho for illegal and unethical 
practices of sellers, that this statute on it's face provided for personal jurisdiction over 
each and every defendant alleged to have engaged in a deceptive consumer practice 
against TELFORD. 
Issue No. 3 
Whether TELFORD"S bid contract was formed in the state of Idaho sufficient 
to invoke personal jurisdiction over all parties to that contract : when TELFORD signed. 
the bid contract in Malad Idaho, TELFORD committed herself to loans and other_ 
financial obligations with Idaho lenders to provide consideration for the bid contract; and 
TELFORD collateralized Idaho personal and real properties to provide securities for the 
loans serving as consideration for the contract. 
During the underlying proceedings, Plaintiff strenuously objected to the 
courts finding that the bid contract that TELFORD executed was formed in the State of 
Texas. Citing again to the record, the bid /purchase contract that TELFORD commited 
in writing : (1) was signed and executed in Malad Idaho (C.R. 343, para. 7) ; (2) was 
supported by money and loan considerations generating from Idaho lenders (see C.R. 
343, para. 7; C.R. 446-447) ; (3) obligated TELFORD to financial commitments in the 
state of Idaho and collaterized TELFORD's Idaho properties (C.R. 343, para. 7), and ; 
(4) the negotiations were the product of more than 9 phone calls, 2 faxes and 6 emails 
sent into the state of Idaho by the Defendants during the negotiations process. C.R. 273. 
para. 3. 
TELFORD provided the following laws to prove that her bid contract was 
formed in Idaho and therefore required adjudication in an Idaho court (C.R. 317-321): 
(1) Under the doctrine of lex loci contractus, a contract is considered 
consummated, formed and executed where the contract is signed. 
See Gates v. Collier, 378 F .2d 888 (9th Cir. 1967) (This circuit adopts 
the rule of lex loci contractus set forth in Restatement of the law of 
the Conflicts of Law § 332 and which makes the law of the place where 
the contract is signed determine the validity, meaning and effect of an 
agreement.). Followed in Yahoo Inc v. La Ligue Cantre Lw Raciseme 
Et L'Antisenitiseme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) ( ... in contract cases, 
we typically inquire into whether a defendant ... "consummate[s] [a] 
transaction" in the forum, focusing on activities such as delivering goods 
to or executing a contract in the forum state. See Schwarzenegger, 
374 F.3d at 802.); Pro Axess Inc. v. Orlux Distribution Inc., Nos. 03-4179, 
03-4189 (10th Cir. 2005) (Exercising personal jurisdiction where a 
contract that was presented through the internet by a French defendant 
was signed in Utah and committed Plaintiff to obligations in Utah in 
perfomance on the contract.). 
(2) A contract is consummated where it is reduced to writing and signed. 
Ray v. Frasure, 200 P.3d 1174, 146 Idaho 625 (ID 2009) (a contract 
is consummated when it is reduced to writing and signed.); See Toivo 
Pottala Logging v. Boise Cascade 733 P.2d 710; 112 Idaho 489 (Idaho 
1987) ( if plaintiff wished to consummate the contract to purchase, he 
usually must sign the standard form prepared by the manufacturer and 
tender consideration.); Black's Law Dictionary's two definitions for 
"executed contract", are: a written and signed contract, or a contract 
that has been fully performed. (9th ed. 2009). 
(3) Contract formation occurs when consideration is tendered to form the 
contract. Mitchell v. Siqueros, 582 P.2d 1074; 99 Idaho 396 (Idaho 
1978) (Contract formation occurs when consideration is given to form the 
contract.); l.C. § 28-2-204, dealing with formation in general provides 
that "[a] contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner ... 
including conduct by a party which recognizes the existence of such 
a contract."); Hudson v. Cobbs, 797 P.2d 1322; 118 Idaho 474 (ID 
1990) (The contracts were formed when Hudson signed them, relying 
on the representations of Cobbs and Kennevick that the leases were 
valid contracts under which they intended to be obligated.). 
(4) Unilateral contracts are consumatted where the offeree accepts the terms 
of the unilateral offer and performs thereunder to secure the promises 
in the offer. See Evanston Insurance Company v. Westchester Surplus 
Lines Insurance Company; Case No. 10-36133 (9th Cir. 10/03/2011), 
the 91h circuit re - affirmed the factual circumstances under which a 
unilateral contract will be formed, executed and subject to enforcement. 
The Ninth circuit cited to Black's Law Dictionary's two definitions for 
"executed contract'', to wit: a written and signed contract, or a contract 
that has been fully performed. (9th ed. 2009). Accordingly, "A unilateral 
contract exists when one party offers to do a certain thing in exchange for 
the other's performance, and performance by the other party constitutes 
acceptance and execution of the contract." Here, the fax from Bellevue 
Master to Northwest on February 22, 2001 was an offer: Northwest would 
be able to continue working as a subcontractor at the construction project 
provided it complied with Bellevue Master's insurance requirements. When 
Northwest contacted its insurance broker and requested that the broker 
issue the insurance certificate to Bellevue Master, Northwest accepted the 
unilateral contract, and a contract was thereby formed, executed and 
subject to enforcement." Idaho also concurs that a unilateral contract will 
be formed and executed when the offeree performs upon the terms of the 
offer in Shore v. Peterson, 204 P.3d 1114, 146 Idaho 903 (Idaho 2009) 
("where the offeror makes a promise that is conditional on the offeree"s 
acceptance, an offeree accepts by rendition of the requested performance.") 
citing CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 21 at 52 (1963) (An offer for a 
unilateral contract calls for acceptance by rendition of the requested 
performance.) J. CALAMARI and J.PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
§ 1-10 (1977). Deer Creek, Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 107 
Idaho 286, 291, 688 P.2d1191,1196 (Ct.App.1984). 
(5) Loan obligations created in the forum state to fund contracts creates 
contacts in the forum state where the payments on the loans are expected 
to generate. Rynone Mfg. Corp. v. Republic Indus., Inc., 96 S.W.3d@ 640, 
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002.) ("Calling a Texas resident in Texas to solicit a 
loan is a purposeful contact with Texas under a contracts anaylsis.) See 
also Pro Axess Inc. v. Orlux Distribution Inc., Nos. 03-4179, 03-4189 
(10th Cir. 2005) ( Exercising personal jurisdiction where a contract that 
was presented through the internet by a French defendant was signed 
in Utah and committed Plaintiff to monetary obligations in Utah in 
perfomance on the contract.); Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, B.V., 
218 P.3d 1150, 148 Idaho 89 {Idaho 2009) (loans obtained locally for 
business purposes result in contact with forum.) same Hsu v. Liu, Case no. 
07-1046 (Texas Supreme Court 2007) 
(6) Phone calls, faxes, letters, and emails sent in the forum state to firm up 
contract negotiations or correct contract errors, are contacts with the forum. 
Neal v. Janssen, 270 F.3d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 2001) ("The acts of making 
phone calls and sending facsimiles into the forum, standing alone, may be 
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the foreign defendant where the phone 
calls and faxes resulted in a consummated contract where consideration 
generated from the forum state.); Oriental Trading Co. v. Firetti, 236 F.3d 
938, 943 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that phone calls and faxes into the forum 
created jurisdiction in suit based on those calls and faxes); Taylor v. Phelan, 
912 F.2d 429, 433 n.4 (10th Cir. 1990) ("So long as it creates a substantial 
connection, even a single telephone call into the forum state can support 
jurisdiction."); FMC Corp. v.Varonos, 892 F.2d 1308, 1313-14 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(sending allegedly false faxes to forum state created specific jurisdiction in 
lawsuit based on those faxes); Brown v. Flowers Indus., 688 F.2d 328, 332-
333 (5th Cir. 1982) (single telephone call initiated by the defendant was 
sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction). 
None of the foregoing transactions occurred in the state of Texas and the 
record is devoid of any evidence competently showing otherwise. Affirming the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Ray v. Frasure, 200 P.3d 1174, 146 Idaho 625 (ID 2009) (a 
contract is consummated when it is reduced to writing and signed.); and Mitchell v. 
Siqueros, 582 P.2d 1074; 99 Idaho 396 (Idaho 1978) (Contract formation occurs 
when consideration is given to form the contract.), there can be no doubt that the contract 
at issue here was formed in Idaho. Moreover Plaintiff performed on the unilateral contract 
in the state of Idaho and obligated herself to numerous debts to fund the transaction. 
Accordingly on contracts grounds, Idaho had the greatest interest in trying Plaintiff's 
contract claims and specific personal jurisdiction existed over the defendants . 
Issue No. 4 
Whether equity claims of specific performance and constructive trust may be 
heard in Idaho courts when pertaining to real estate located outside the state of Idaho -
when the fraud or deception practiced by the tortfeasor specifically caused to the 
equitable claims to arise to the injury of an Idaho resident. here TELFORD. 
In the instant case, Judge Dunn ruled that TELFORD could not meet the 
tortious injury prong of the Idaho Long Arm Statute because the transaction involved the 
purchase of real property in the State of Texas which could not be physically delivered to 
Telford in Idaho. C.R. 420, para. 1 : 
" If the real property [sic but] had been portable and Telford had " 
taken possession of the property in Idaho, like the purchaser in 
Blimka, then the tort prong of the Idaho Long Arm Statute may 
have allowed this Court to exercise jurisdiction over the 
Defendants. However, real property is not portable. Under 
these circumstances the injury could only be felt in Texas. 
TELFORD contends that the court errored in self fashioning the demands of 
Plaintiff's Complaint. Nowhere in the underlying litgation did TELFORD ask that the real 
property be delivered to her. On the contrary, all pleadings on file with the trial court 
made equitable demands of specific performance and constructive trust. C.R. 394 , C.R. 
395 footnote 4. 
The seminole case supporting TELFORD's contention that the trial court should 
have ordered SMITH county to TURN OVER THE DEED TO TELFORD is Andre v. 
Morrow, 680 P.2d 1355; 106 Idaho 455 (Idaho 1984). 10 
10. A brief analysis of that case is as follows: 
Plaintiff-Respondent (Andre) brought an action in California against 
defendantsappellants (Morrows), Idaho residents, to impose a constructive trust on 
certain real property located in Idaho, in which the Morrows held legal title and which 
Andre asserted they had allegedly acquired through fraud committed upon Andre's 
conservtee. The California Court ruled in favor of Andre and ordered the Morrows to 
As set forth in Morrow, a California court determined that Morrow, an Idaho 
resident, had committed fraud against a California resident and obtained title to Idaho 
property owne byt the California resident. A conxtructive trust was ordered and 
Marrowed was directed to convey title back to the California resident. 
The same results should have obtained in the instant action. There is no 
question that fraud and deciet were practiced upon TELFORD within the meaning of 
Idaho's consumer Protection Act and the Idaho RICO Act. The Idaho consumer 
Protection Act provides for equitable relief as an additional remedy and also provides for 
automatic personal jurisdiction over Defendants alleged to have engaged in unfair 
practices. Therefore, the court could have granted TELFORD numerous requests to turn 
convey the title to Andre. Andre filed a copy of the California judgment with the Clerk of 
the District Court for Nez Perce County, Idaho, and sought full faith and credit on the 
judgment. The Morrows attacked the California judgment asserting that it was not entitled 
to recognition because the California court lacked jurisdiction to directly affect title to 
property located in Idaho. This contention is error. 
It is well settled that upon a finding of personal jurisdiction, a court of a 
foreign state can issue a personal judgment ordering a conveyance of real property 
by a party before that court and that this is a valid exercise of a court's power. 
Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal.2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957); Idaho Gold Mining Co. v. Winchell, 6 
Idaho 729,59 P. 533 (1899); Millerv. Miller, 109 Misc.2d 982, 441 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1981 ); 
Blue River Sawmills, Ltd. v. Gates, 225 Or. 439,358 P.2d 239 (1960); Silver Surprize, Inc. 
v. Sunshine Mining Co., 74 Wash.2d 519, 445 P.2d 334 (1968); 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 
889 h. (1947), Lorenzen, Application of Full Faith and Credit Clause to Equitable Decrees 
for the Conveyance of Foreign Land, 34 Yale L.J. 591 (1925); 50 C.J.S. Judgments§ 889 
h. (1947). Courts are authorized to issue equity decrees which order an in 
personam conveyance of land located in another state. Varone v. Varone, 359 F.2d 
769 (7th Cir.1966); Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal.2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957); Ivey v. Ivey, 183 
Conn. 490, 439 A.2d 425 (1981); Weesner.v. Weesner, 168 Neb. 346, 95 N.W.2d 682 
(1959); Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, supra; Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws 
§ 102 comment d (1971 ). 
Here, the California court determined that it had personal jurisdiction over the 
Morrows under the tortious injury prong of California's long arm statute through the fraud 
committed by the Morrows upon the conservetee, a California resident. We affirm the trial 
court's judgment directing the Morrows to convey title in the real property to Andre. Furthermore 
the Morrows are to pay attorneys fees and costs. 
The California Court had authority to order a constructive trust over the property 
assets and title where legal title to property has been obtained through actual fraud, 
misrepresentations, concealments, taking advantage of one's necessities, or under 
circumstances otherwise rendering it unconscionable for the holder of legal title to retain beneficial 
interest in the property. Davenport v. Burke, 30 Idaho 599, 167 P.481 (1917). 
over title or pay TELFORD the market value of the improved property. 
The trial Court did neither to the substantial prejudice of TELFORD. 
Issue No. 5 
Whether l.C. 19-302 may be used as a jurisdictional statute to invoke personal 
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants who commit in whole or in part any element of a 
racketeering predicate act within the state of Idaho. 
l.C. § 19-302 has been interpreted to mean that personal jurisdiction will exist 
if the conduct performed outside the state caused a criminal result or effect within the 
state. Personal Jurisdiction under criminal law is the loci where one element of a 
crime is completed. See Idaho v. Doyle, 828 P.2d 1316; 121 Idaho 911 (10, 1992) 
(Such an interpretation is in harmony with the general rule that "the requisite elements of 
the completed crime may be committed in different jurisdictions, and in such cases any 
state in which an element of the crime is committed may take jurisdiction.n[Footnote 4121 
Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 345 at 598 (1981 ); accord Findley v. State, 307 Ark. 53, 818 
S.W> 2d 242 (1991); State v. Lane, 112 Wash.2d 464,771 P.2d 1150 (1989); -tate v. 
Schaaf, 234 Neb. 144,449 N.W.2d 762 (1989); State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. Z69, 645 P.2d 
784 (1982). 
Furthermore, the civil racketeering act has the same rules imposed upon it as are 
imposed in the criminal forum, except the standard of proof is lower under the civil form. 
See 18-7803. Definitions. As used in this chapter, (a) "Racketeering" means any act 
which is chargeable or indictable under the following sections ofthe Idaho Code or which 
are equivalent acts chargeable or indictable as equivalent crimes under the laws of any 
other jurisdiction. 
One such case where the criminal statute was applied in a civil contempt case to 
acquire personal jurisdiction over Doyle was in Idaho v. Doyle, 828 P.2d 1316; 121 Idaho 
911 (ID, 1992) The facts and legal conclusion of that case were as follows: 
On August 19, 1988, a complaint against Doyle was filed with the 
Ada County District Court for the crime of child custody interference and a 
warrant was issued for his arrest. Doyle was returned to Idaho for 
prosecution. He filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Doyle 
argued that because neither he nor Cindy nor Shawn were in Idaho when 
any act of withholding may have occurred, such act must have occurred in 
either the State of Oregon or the State of Washington. Therefore, under l.C. § 
19-301, the State of Idaho was allegedly without jurisdiction to prosecute the 
action. The trial court denied Doyle's motion to dismiss, finding that the 
state did have jurisdiction under l.C. § 19·302 because the crime was 
consummated within Idaho. 
We first note our standard of review. Subject matter jurisdiction 
presents a question of law over which we exercise free review. Hanson v. 
State, 121 Idaho 507,826 P.2d 468 (1992): Gage v. Harris, 119 Idaho 
451,807 P.2d 1289 (Ct.App.1991). Reflecting this approach, l.C. §,18-202 
sets forth Idaho's territorial jurisdiction as follows: Territorial jurisdiction 
over accused persons liable to punishment. --The following persons are 
liable to punishment under the laws of this state: 
1. All persons who commit, in whole or in part, any crime within 
this state. This Court has stated that it must be inferred from the language 
of Subsection 1. of the above statute that "the legislature intended to 
punish any person who should commit any portion of a crime within this 
state to the same extent and in the same manner as though all of the acts 
which constitute the crime had been committed here." State v. Sheehan, 
33 Idaho 553, 561-62, 196 P. 532, 534 (1921). States with statutes similar 
to l.C. § 19-302 have interpreted them to mean. that jurisdiction will 
exist if the conduct performed outside the state caused a criminal 
result or effect within the state. [Footnote 3] See Wheat v. State, 734 
P.2d 1007, 1010 (Alaska Ct.App .1987) ("crime committed when results in 
injury in the state."); 
Such an interpretation is in harmony with the general nile that nthe 
requisite elements of the completed crime may be committed in different 
jurisdictions, and in such cases any state in which an essential part of the 
crime is committed may take jurisdiction."[Footnote 4) 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal 
Law§ 345 at 598 (1981): accord Findley v. State, 307 Ark. 53, 818 S.W.2d 
242 (1-991); State v. Lane, 112 Wash.2d 464, 771 P.2d 1150 (1989); State v. 
Schaaf, 234 Neb. 144,449 N.W.2d 762 (1989); State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. 
269,645 P.2d 784 (1982). This general rule is also acknowledged in the Model 
Penal Code which states that a person can be prosecuted if either the 
conduct which is an element of the offense or the result which is an element 
of the injury occurs within the State." Model Penal Code§ 1.03(1)(a). 
Given this statutory structure, an Idaho court will have subject matter 
jurisdiction over a crime if any essential element of the crime, even a result, 
occurs within Idaho. 
Under federal law 18 USC section 7803, the civil racketeering act has the 
same rules imposed upon it as are imposed in the criminal forum, except the standard of 
poot is lower under the civil form. As such, Plaintiff contends that the criminal rule for 
imposing personal jurisdiction over an out of state defendant eqaully applies to Idaho's 
racketeering act. 
Plaintiff's complaint charged the Defendants with the following criminal acts: 
l.C. 18-2403. Theft. 
(1) A person steals property and commits theft when, with intent to 
deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself 
or to a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such 
property from an owner thereof. 
(d) By false promise: 
1. A person obtains property by false promise when pursuant 
to a scheme to defraud, he obtains property of another by 
means of a representation, express or implied. that he or a 
third person will in the future engage in particular conduct, 
and when he does not intend to engage in such conduct or, 
as the case may be, does not believe that the third person 
intends to engage in such conduct 
(e) By extortion : 
A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or 
induces another person to deliver such property to himself or to 
a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the 
property is not so delivered, the actor or another will: 
4. Accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to 
be instituted against him; or 
7. Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information 
with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or 
8. Use or abuse his position as a public servant by performing some 
act within or related to his official duties, or by failing or refusing 
to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some 
person adversely; or 
9. Perform any other act which would not in itself materially benefit 
the actor but which is calculated to harm another person materially 
with respect to his health, safety, business, calling, career, 
financial condition, reputation or personal relationships. 
The record shows that plaintiff complained of the foregoing conduct from the 
outset of the case. First, Plaintiff alleged theft by false promises over a coarse of 4 
months until the defendants successfully stole more than $250,000 in residential portable 
and non portable properties from Plaintiff. 
Next Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants committed theft by extortion by 
engaging in the foregoing conduct that met the elements of this crime; all within the state 
of Idaho and by illicit abuse of Idaho public offices. 
Accordingly, there is no question that jurisdiction exists in the Idaho on 
Plaintiff's RICO claims contrary to the court's summary conclusion. 
Issue No. 6: 
Whether the specially appearing defendants actually made a general_ 
appearance in the underlying action because they failed to limit their initial motion to an 
attack on personal jurisdiction only. 
The record shows that the defendants made a general appearance by arguing 
the merits of plaintiff's substantive claims in tandem with arguing personal jurisdiction 
issues. C.R. 67-89. Plaintiff contends that the defendants should have stayed out of 
court on all of their merits argument until they sustained a ruling on personal jurisdiction 
only under rule 4(i). Accordingly, plaintiff contends that the defendants made a general 
appearance and waived the issue of personal jurisdiction. 
Issue No. 7 
Whether the trial court errored as a matter of law when he entered a final 
judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims against the specially appearing defendants with 
prejudice on the grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction. in violation of IRCP rule 41 (b). 
IRCP Rule 41(b) provides in part: 
... Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise 
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any 
dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, or for failure to join 
a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits. 
In Scott v. Agricultural Products, 627 P.2d 326; 102 Idaho 147 (ID 1981) : The 
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed that a Dismissal for lack of jurisdiction should be without 
prejudice under rule 41 (b). The Court held that because the district court did not qualify 
his dismissal order, we so modify the order to be without prejudice as a dismissal under 
Rule 41 (b), otherwise the dismissal with prejudice will bar a subsequent action involving 
the same claim between the parties or their privies. Costello v. United States, 365 U.DS. 
265, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961). See also Bauscher Grain v. Nat'I Sur. Corp., 92 
Idaho 229, 440 P.2d 349 (1968); National Ro-Tile Corp. v. Loomis, 82 Idaho, 65, 350 P.2d 
217 (1960). 
The record herein shows that on February 29, 2012, Judge Dunn entered a final 
judgment in this action dismissing plaintiffs claims against the specially appearing 
defendants with prejudice as C.R. 423-425. The entire trial record shows that the Court 
refused to reach any other issue or claim other than the issue of personal jurisdiction. 
As provided by Rule 41 (b), and Scott supra, the Court was without authority to dismiss 
plantiff's claims agianst the specially appearing defendants with prejudice and should 
have dismissed these claims without prejudice. TELFORD asks this court to reverse the 
trial court's ruling. 
Issue No. 8 
Whether the trial court errored in not allowing TELFORD to amend her 
complaint in accordance with the evidence presented before the conclusion of the case. 
It is uncontested that the proceedings before the trial court were summary 
judgment proceedings and therefore not based soely on the initial pleading in the action. 
Several times during the coarse of the proceedings, TELFORD asked for permission to 
amend the complaint to add in new and additional allegations. Judge Dunn decline 
TELFORD's request because final judgment had been entered. C.R. 451. 
However the rules of civil procedure rule 15(b) and Thomas v. Arkoosh 
Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 48 P.3d 1241 (Idaho 2002) hold: l.R.C.P. 15(b) provides: 
Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the pleading are 
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if 
they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be 
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be 
made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to 
amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. 
Furthermore, Thomas supra decisioned that claims not raised in the pleadings 
may be argued in motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. Same in Consolidated 
AG of Curry, Inc. v. Rangen, Inc., 128 Idaho 228,912 P.2d115 (Idaho 1996) (The trial court 
properly concluded that the issues that would allow plaintiff to recover against IFA directly 
were tried by 'implied consent' of I FA.) 
Accordingly, plaintiff was entitled to amend her complaint as a matter of law, 
even after final judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiff requests that this court direct a 
wholesale reversal of the judgments of the trial court and hold that personal jurisdiction 
existed over all defendants in the underlying case; enter defaults and default judgments 
against every non-appearing defendant; remand plaintiff's case against the 
Appellees/Defendants appearing in this appeal for trial on the merits, and direct the trial 
court to permit plaintiff to amend her chief complaint to conform to the evidence. 
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